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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
imminently dangerous.' 8 Further, it should be noted that such lia-
bility is not predicated upon any theory of contract or warranty.14
Indeed such an idea was expressly repudiated in New York, where,
speaking of the liability of makers of dangerous instruments to third
persons the court said: "This is not upon the ground of warranty
express or implied, but because the vendor owes to the public a duty
not to expose human life to danger by negligently and carelessly put-
ting upon the market an article as harmless, which is in fact dan-
gerous." '- Judicial protest against any doctrine extending the right
of persons to sue ex-contractu in such cases is not wanting.',6
As far as third persons are concerned, warranties are of sig-
nificance only insofar as their breach constitutes negligence.i 7 In any
case of breach of warranty therefor, there can be no recovery by a
third person where the breach alone is relied upon. Where a third
person was injured because of a defect in a vacuum cleaner which
constituted a breach of warranty to the purchaser, recovery was de-
nied.' 8 It would seem from the above that in the case of a chattel
inherently dangerous, no negligence appearing, a person injured be-
cause of a defect, amounting to a breach of warranty to the purchaser,
cannot recover. Also, that in the case of a chattel not within the
"dangerous instrumentality" rule, where there is a defect amounting
to a breach of warranty, negligence is immaterial.' 9 There can be no
recovery ex delicto or ex contractu.
A.W.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-CONTRACT BY RAILROAD TO ERECT
STATION-SUFFICIENCY OF DEFENSES OF LACK OF NECESSITY-
HARDSHIP.-In 1905 the legislature authorized the city of New York
to grant to the defendants the right to use certain underground areas
for track and station facilities; plans therefor to be subject to approval
See note 11, supra.
,"If to the element of danger, there is added knowledge they will be used
by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new test, then, irrespec-
tive of contract, the manufacturer of this instrument of danger is under a duty
to make it carefully." [Italics ours.] Cardozo, J., in McPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 389, 111 N. E. 1050, 1053 (1916).5 Favo v. Remington Arms Co., 67 App. Div. 414, 73 N. Y. Supp. 788
(3d Dept. 1901); see National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195, 204,
25 L. ed. 621, 624 (1879).
1" See National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195, 25 L. ed. 621; David-
son v. Nichols, 11 Allen 514 (Mass. 1866).
'1 Cunningham v. C. R. Pease House Furnishing Co., 74 N. H. 435, 69
Atl. 120 (1908) semble.
Galvin v. Lynch, 137 Misc. 126, 241 N. Y. Supp. 479 (1930).
" The result, in the instant case, would seem to indicate that even shoes
might be included in the "dangerous instrumentality" rule. See Note (1938)
12 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 281.
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RECENT DECISIONS
of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment.' Prior to 1917 plans
were submitted and approved and a contract entered into whereby,
among other things, the defendant agreed to erect a station. In an
action for specific performance brought by the city in 1935, the rail-
road company defends on grounds that a change of traffic conditions
in neighborhood of proposed station renders its construction unneces-
sary and, in fact, detrimental to service and public interests; that due
to lack of adequate funds specific performance will impose a great
hardship on defendant, with no corresponding benefit to plaintiff; and
that subsequent legislation has rendered the contract unenforceable.
Held, judgment for defendant. Where conditions have so changed in
the interval as to render performance unduly burdensome or impos-
sible and public convenience and necessity no longer demand compli-
ance, a court of equity will refuse to grant specific performance. City
of New York v. N. Y. Central Railroad Co., 275 N. Y. 287, 9 N. E.
(2d) 931 (1937).
It is a cardinal rule that in an action to specifically enforce a con-
tract the one seeking enforcement must act promptly.2 Unexplained
delay is evidence of waiver and acquiescence in non-performance.3
During the interval between the time the right to enforce arises and
the time of bringing suit, the situation of the parties may change
radically. Whether specific performance will be granted or withheld
is a matter entirely within the court's discretion,4 and if the change
of circumstances would impose a hardship and injustice on defen-
dant, this form of relief may be denied; especially when the action is
accompanied by unreasonable delay. This result may follow, although
the action is brought within the period allowed by the Statute of
Limitations.Y The rule has been ably stated by judge Dansforth and
substantially followed by a series of decisions. 6 So, in railroad cases,
'N. Y. LAws (1909) c. 558.
'Delavan v. Duncan, 49 N. Y. 485, 488 (1872). In FRY, SPEciFic PER-
FORMANCE (6th ed. 1921) § 1102 the author says: "The doctrine of the court thus
established, therefore, is that laches on the part of the plaintiff either in execut-
ing his part of the contract or in applying to the court, will debar him from
relief."
'Halstead v. Grinnen, 152 U. S. 416, 14 Sup. Ct. 641 (1894); Nash v.
Milford, 33 App. D. C. 142 (1909); McLaurie v. Barnes, 72 Ill. 73 (1874);
Eads v. Williams (1854); 4 De G. M. & G. 674, 43 Eng. Reprint 671.
'Bruce v. Tilson, 25 N. Y. 202 (1862); Peters v. Delaplaine, 49 N. Y.
362, 367 (1872) ; Conger v. N. Y. W. S. & B. R. R., 120 N. Y. 29, 23 N. E.
983 (1890); (1914) 28 HARv. L. REv. 110.
'Peters v. Delaplaine, 49 N. Y. 362, 367 (1872). For a comprehensive
collation of cases see 65 A. L. R. 12 et seq.
'In Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311 (1882), Dans-
forth, J., said: "Though a contract was just and fair when made, enforcement
in a court of equity will be denied, if subsequent events have made performance
by defendant so onerous that enforcement will impose great hardships on him
and cause little or no benefit to plaintiff." McClure v. Leaycraft, 183 N. Y.
36, 75 N. E. 961 (1905); Batchelor v. Hinkle, 210 N. Y. 243, 104 N. E. 629
(1914) ; McCann v. Chasm Power Co., 211 N. Y. 301, 105 N. E. 416 (1914);
Forstman v. Joray Holding Co., Inc., 244 N. Y. 22, 154 N. E. 652 (1926);
Schefer v. Ball, 53 Misc. 448, 104 N. Y. Supp. 1028 (1907).
1938)
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a contract which hampers or unreasonably interferes with the service
a railway offers to the public or with the erection of stations at other
points, will not be enforced as contrary to public policy.
7
In accordance with the rules enunciated, relief was properly de-
nied in the instant case. The defense of unenforceability, due to an
act now requiring permission from the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission 8 by railroads wishing to raise money to build, was held by
the court to be merely one of the material facts, constituting change of
conditions, but which, standing alone, would not be a sufficient de-
fense to specific performance.
It would be interesting to inquire whether the court would grant
specific performance in the absence of an unreasonable delay and
change of circumstances of the parties. The general rule has been
well settled that contracts for building and construction will not be
specifically enforced because of difficulty of supervision.9 Among the
most notable exceptions to the general rule are cases where land to
be improved or built on is in defendant's possession, 10 and more re-
cently, landlords' covenants to compel building during the term of
lease." New York, holding fast to Beck v. Allison, has been less
liberal than most jurisdictions in granting equitable relief. However,
where the public interest is involved, not being able to measure the
loss in dollars and cents, the court will suffer the necessary incon-
venience and grant relief.12
P. M. L.
'Texas & P. R. R. v. Marshall, 136 U. S. 393, 10 Sup. Ct. 846 (1890);
Beasley v. Texas etc. R. R., 191 U. S. 492, 24 Sup. Ct. 164 (1903); Conger v.
N. Y. W. S. & B. R. R., 120 N. Y. 29, 23 N. E. 983 (1890); Herzog v.
Atchinson, T. etc. R. R., 153 Cal. 496, 95 Pac. 898 (1908) ; Mobile etc. R. R.
v. People, 132 Ill. 559, 24 N. E. 643 (1890).
'TRANS. AcT (1920) §20-a. This Act changed the conditions under
which any financing may be undertaken and approved and would now require
defendants to secure approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission before
they can issue the necessary securities for financing a new station.
'Beck v. Allison, 56 N. Y. 366 (1874); Crane v. Roach, 29 Cal. App.
584, 156 Pac. 375 (1916) ; Robinson v. Luther, 134 Iowa 463, 109 N. W. 775
(1906) ; see POUND, THE PROGRESS OF THE LAW-EQUITY (1919) 33 HARV. L.
REv. 420, at 432. But see Doty v. Rensselaer, 194 App. Div. 841, 185 N. Y.
Supp. 466 (3d Dept. 1921), approved in (1921) 21 COL. L. REV. 495; cf. Jack-
son v. Normandy Brick Co., 1 Ch. 438 (1899).
"0 Straus v. Estates of Long Beach, 187 App. Div. 876, 176 N. Y. Supp.
447 (2d Dept. 1919).
' Jones v. Parker, 168 Mass. 564, 40 N. E. 1044 (1895); N. Y. Central
R. R. v. Stoneham, 223 Mass. 258, 123 N. E. 679 (1919).
ILa Follette v. La Follette Water Co., 252 Fed. 762 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918);
Larchmont v. Larchmont Park, 185 App. Div. 330, 173 N. Y. Supp. 32 (2d
Dept. 1918); Chambersburg v. Chambersburg etc. R. R., 258 Pa. 57, 101 Atl.
922 (1917).
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